A particularly interesting case comes from the late thirteenth century Canterbury records. The complainant apparently had brought his original action at the papal court. As was normal, this resulted in the delegation of papal jurisdiction to a local cleric, in this case an English prior. The rescript of delegation, specifying the terms of law by which the prior was to decide the case, did not mention the constitution of Oxford. But the libel in the actual trial was quite specific. The defendant was alleged to have fallen "in sentenciam maioris excommunicationis in consilio Oxon' contra tales diffamatores latam." 11 Even here, the Provincial constitution provided the framework for the hearing. The wording of that constitution determined the scope of the remedy for defamation available in the English Church courts.
All defamation actions had, therefore, to be based on the precise wording of the constitution. It determined, in the first place, what words were actionable. The statute specified that the language must have imputed a crime to the complainant. The cases bear this out. It was defamatory to call someone a thief, as in a London action where a man said, "Thow art the woman that stolest the kyetyll from 8. Councils and Synods, I, 496 for York; II, 820 for Durham, which follows the Southern model.
9. The precise language of the Constitution is repeated in these formularies: British Museum, Reg. II A XI, fols. a "strong harlot" was probably no more than a term of general abuse.21 But the words technically included a crime punishable in a public court. Therefore they were enough to give rise to a claim for defamation. Words which were merely abusive were not.
It was not necessary, however, that the crime be actually named or unequivocally stated. If the words implied the commission of a crime, this was enough. The doctrine of mitior sensus which complicated the early Common Law remedy found no place in the canon law courts.22 To say, for example, "I see a monk at the door of the priory of Rochester who did not lie in his own bed that night," while a monk was standing in the doorway, gave rise to a cause of action in a Rochester case of 1462.23 It implied the monk's incontinence. Similarly, for a man to say that he had found a woman "lying together with Richard Porter in a barn with the doors closed," was enough to allow the woman to sue for defamation. That the words could be construed to imply something other than fornication was apparently no defense.24 In an interesting York case from 1424, Thomas More was cited for claiming to have spoken with 'the spirit of a dead man. The spirit had ordered him, he claimed, to tell the dead man's son to restore property wrongfully taken from More. This had been sufficient, it seems, to have given rise to common fame that the dead man had stolen the goods. To clear the dead man's name, More was required to do public penance during divine service. He had to announce to the local congregation that he had falsely defamed the dead man.25
Considerable latitude was thus allowed in the degree of specificity with which the crime had to be named. Because of this fact, the canonical remedy for defamation covered a broader range of insulting words than might at first appear. The number of human 21. The term is many times repeated in the late fifteenth century London records. See Guildhall, Act book MS. 9064/ 1 (1470-73).
22. On this rule, under which defendants sought to escape liability by claiming that their words could technically be construed so as not to con- But it is another question whether the ecclesiastical courts habitually entertained such abusive actions. The Constitution of Oxford specifically required that the imputation be made maliciously. Lyndwood, glossing that word, gave it as a rule that accusations made and proved in the course of legal proceedings did not fall within the wording of the Constitution.29 By definition, they were not made maliciously. He drew no distinction between secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions. Neither, it would seem from Lyndwood's treatment, would give rise to a defamation action.
The actual court records, while not so full here as one could wish, suggest that Lyndwood's rule was observed in practice. In a Rochester defamation action brought for imputation of theft, the complaint was dismissed when the defendant showed that his only offense consisted of having brought an action for wrongful conversion against the complainant.30 In another case, an archdeacon sued for defamation successfully pleaded that his accusation of adultery against the complainant had been made in the course of a judicial action. He had been merely carrying out his duties.31 There is a case from York in 1364 where an action for defamation was allowed after a secular prosecution for theft. But it was also shown that in the secular court the complainant had established his innocence. Notwithstanding that fact, the defendant had repeatedly uttered his accusations of theft. He was apparently dissatisfied with the judgment vindicating the complainant. Here the Church court allowed a remedy.32 This is not to say, of course, that no actions based on the previous indictment or suit at Common Law were ever entertained in the ecclesiastical courts. Surely they were. Lyndwood's gloss does in fact leave room for actions against an unsuccessful accuser who acted out of malice towards an innocent man. But even leaving this case aside, one must recognize that the procedure of the Church courts could be used against innocent men as well as the procedure of the royal courts. Complicated court systems nearly always leave room for abuse. But the requirement of malice was an attempt, within the canon law itself, to deal with that abuse. And the records do not indicate that the Church encouraged large numbers of actions against Common Law indictors. It is dangerous to take the Common Lawyers' objections to a practice, and to draw the conclusion that the practice was the norm in the Church courts. For the legal historian, it is noteworthy that defamation by prior judicial action was excluded from coverage by the Oxford constitution's requirement of malice. The necessity of malice in the later Common Law remedy, as modem commentators often note, has given rise to considerable difficulties, not wholly resolved by legal fictions developed over the course of time.33 It would be rash, until more research has been done on the growth of defamation in the royal courts, to say categorically that this requirement came into English law by way of the canon law. I can do no more than suggest that English law may have included the requirement of malice because it incorporated this part of the canonical action. It is at least a strong possibility.
To say this, of course, attaches no blame to the canon law remedy. The requirement of malice was not at all out of place in the Church courts. Since, as we shall see, the punishment of the defamer was varied according to his guilt and to the degree of harm he had caused, it was quite relevant for the judge to know with what malice a defendant had acted. In a London case of 1495, for example, we learn that after accusing a woman of giving birth to a priest's child, William Strome immediately thought better of it. He apologized for his words. He asked for the woman's pardon.34 Or, to take the opposite case, in the York court one defendant was said to have remarked after his initial accusation, "What I saw I wish to say and never to deny." 35 In another case, it was relevant that the imputation had been made repeatedly (iteratibus vicibus) and not just in the heat of anger (non tantum calore iracundie).36 All these were important in assessing the seriousness of the ill fame, the extent of its spread, and the proper remedy for its public correction.
According to the Oxford constitution, the complainant in a defamation action had to show some sort of harm. At least, it reads, he must have been put to a canonical purgation as a result.37 In practice, such a purgation often became merely a preliminary to a defamation action. A man, alleging that a crime had wrongfully been imputed to him, came before the judge and "asked to purge himself of that crime." 38 Or a judge might assign purgation because of widespread public fame.39 If the defamed person successfully purged himself, an action for defamation, tried like any other instance case, could begin. This sort of purgation was an entirely normal part of canon law where there was public fame of a crime.40 The English action for defamation built on that procedure. In practice then, no actual damages had to be shown where purgation was used. But allegations of actual damages were by no means uncommon. They were again relevant to assessing the amount of harm done and the proper way of restoring a complainant to good fame. Thus we find in the libel and articles claims that the words had "caused the complainant to lose his goods," ' or that he had "sustained several labors, expenses and vexations on account of the imposition of this crime," 42 or that a woman's husband had "refused to admit her to his bed as he was accustomed to" 43 on account of the slanderous words.
Conversely, defendants sometimes answered that no damage had in fact occurred. In a York case of 1356, for example, it was said that the complainant was "of no worse fame after the utterance than before." 44 As this suggests, the most frequent defense to defamation actions was the existence of prior defamation. If a man had been previously and publicly reputed to be guilty of the same other "spiritual" penalties alone are detailed in the remaining documents.
Whether this is a direct consequence of the availability of a writ of prohibition is not entirely clear. The Constitution, it should be remembered, spoke only of the excommunication of an offender. It offered, in other words, only a spiritual penalty. It can thus be argued that the canon law remedy gave no direct money damages in the first place. Of course, this is true in a sense of all canonical actions. Excommunication was the severest penalty in the canon law.49 Even in actions brought to enforce contracts, the suits for breach of faith which filled the English Church courts in the Middle Ages, the sanction for refusal to fulfill a contract was always excommunication. But it may be that there were special reasons within the canon law itself for limiting defamation actions to spiritual penalties. Quite apart from the limitations of the English law, there were practical reasons for avoiding the routine award of damages in the formal sentences.
First, a formal excommunication followed by informal bargaining about restitution to the injured party in exchange for the lifting of the sentence was an entirely suitable way of handling defamation cases. The number of variables in these actions was very large. There was something to be said for leaving In some defamation actions, the remedy was more elaborate. The order from a York case, for example, called for the defendant "at the time of High Mass, the parishioners being present (to) say in a loud and intelligible voice that he had erred in his words, which were uttered from false information of others, and (to) humbly ask pardon" of the complainant.54 In a Hereford action, the defendant had again to publicly ask pardon during divine service and to say "that he had uttered the words out of evil will, not from zealousness, and that he had been moved by anger." 55 It is not romanticism, I think, to suggest that penalties such as these more effectively restored an injured reputation than the award of money damages would have. Perhaps many litigants would have preferred a pecuniary penalty. But that is not necessarily a criticism of the canonical action. Its aim was to punish unjust slander and to undo its effects, not to reward the avarice of litigants.
Most defamation cases, however, never reached the stage of sentence and penance. I have no exact figures, but certainly the large majority ended in compromise and agreement. The notation "pax" written alongside a case in the Act book marked a frequent end.56 The continuance "sub spe concordie" was another.57 A concord could be admitted even after formal sentencing where the parties had reached subsequent agreement.58 The Church courts were never concerned to push defamation actions through to formal sentence. No special license to concord was demanded.
One of the principal goals of any legal system must be to bring quarrelling people to amicable settlement. Surely this is true where insulting and damaging words have been the substance of the quarrel. So far as the court records indicate, it was this goal which It is too soon, as Professor Milsom has recently noted, to write the full history of early defamation at Common Law.59 A good deal is already known, of course.60 But only the painstaking examination of the early sixteenth century plea rolls will tell the story of the development of the secular remedy. The process will certainly have to be studied against the background of the canon law action outlined above. Comparison with canonical practice should illuminate the process by which the royal courts assimilated, or half-assimilated, the ecclesiastical action. It may be that some of the defects and anomalies of the Common Law remedy existed solely because they were taken over whole from the canon law. 61 Even if this is true, however, it will not prove an equal weakness in the canonical action. That action was by no means perfect from a strictly legal standpoint. The failure to include allegations of professional incompetence and the too ready availability of the defense of prior defamation must be counted as faults in the law. But, when this has been said, the records tell a largely positive story. The Church courts took in a large class of defamatory language, they considered a broad range of evidence, and they made available a varied set of remedies. The records, examined here, suggest that the Church courts provided a useful remedy for men injured by harsh and insulting words. 
